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Currency Crises from Andrew Jackson to Angela Merkel 
 
I contend in this paper that many so-called banking crises are in fact currency crises.  I do 
so in three steps.  First, a bit of simple theory to structure the discussion.  Second, a narrative of 
currency crises in the last two centuries, and finally some thoughts about conditions today. 
 Any survey of past crises has to take account of Reinhart and Rogoff’s magisterial history 
of what they call financial folly.  They classify financial crises as banking crises and foreign 
(external) and domestic (internal) debt crises (Reinhard and Rogoff, 2009, p. 11).  They discuss 
currency debasements in the context of external debt crises, but they do not separate a category 
of currency crises.  I therefore add it to their categories as an analog of banking crises.  I define a 
currency crisis as a dramatic decrease in a country’s nominal exchange rate or increase in its 
currency controls.  Speed and size of the change add to the drama, but there is no bright line 
separating crises from devaluations. 
Recall that banks experience runs when depositors fear that banks will not be able to cash 
out their deposits at par.  A country can experience a run on its currency when investors fear that 
the country will not be able to purchase its currency at par.  There has to be a par for a currency 
for this analogy to hold, and currency crises are a phenomenon of fixed exchange rates.  They 
therefore involve countries on gold or silver standards before the Great Depression and with 
fixed exchange rates thereafter.  Even banking crises in the interwar years were confined to 
countries on the gold standard (Grossman, 1994).   
Krugman (1979) started the modern literature on currency crises with the demonstration 
that they occur before countries actually run out of foreign reserves when investors fear that they 
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are on a path to do so.  I rely on Krugman’s insight but use here an older theory that allows us to 
back up a bit and discuss the origins of investor fears rather than the moment of crisis, following 
Reinhart and Rogoff.  Trevor Swan (1955) represented the interaction of internal balance and 
external balance in what has become known as the Swan Diagram, which can be used to 
understand the links between internal and external balances that are the focus of this paper.   
The Swan Diagram concerns two markets, and it contains two variables.  The markets are 
for domestically produced goods and for international payments; the variables are domestic 
production and the real exchange rate.  As with the IS/LM diagram, a quantity is on the 
horizontal axis while a price is on the vertical axis.  The Swan Diagram puts domestic demand 
on the horizontal axis, consisting of consumption plus investment, government purchases plus 
net exports, sometimes known as absorption.  The vertical axis is the real exchange rate, that is, 
the nominal exchange rate times the ratio of prices at home and abroad.  For simplicity, I present 
the real exchange rate as the value of the home currency abroad, so a fall in the real exchange 
rate can be brought about by a depreciation of the currency or by a fall in costs and prices at 
home relative to costs and prices abroad. A fall in the real exchange rate, measured this way, 
means that the country is becoming more competitive relative to countries abroad.  
 The first of the two markets is domestic production, expressed as the familiar Keynesian 
definition of national production or income: 
 Y = C + I + G + (X – M) 
Production is the same as income, since income includes the payments to those who produce 
goods and services; these payments, together with any taxes paid, equal the value of what is 
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produced. A country is in internal balance when domestic production is just large enough to fully 
use all the resources in the economy; that is, when labor is fully employed and inflation is low. 
The second market is for international payments.  It is measured as the balance on current 
account in the national accounts, and it is roughly equal to exports, minus imports: 
 B = X – M 
A country is in external balance when exports are just large enough to fully pay for imports so 
that foreign trade is balanced, allowing for any payments of interest which have to be made 
abroad and for any long-term capital inflow or foreign direct investment going to the country. 
These equations already show the most important lesson of the Swan Diagram; internal 
balance and external balance must be thought about at the same time. The level of domestic 
production and the balance on current account are clearly related to each other.  The first 
equation shows that whenever there are higher exports or reduced imports, that is, whenever 
there is an increase in net exports, this will add to demand for domestic goods and so to domestic 
production.  But higher domestic production increases the demand for imports and worsens the 
balance of payments on current account from the second equation. So attempts to achieve 
internal balance, by having an appropriate level of domestic production, and attempts to achieve 
external balance, by having an appropriate level of the balance of payments on current account, 
must be thought about together.  
The diagram shows how to do this joined-up thinking. Consider first external balance.  
As the real exchange rate drops, a country’s exports become more attractive abroad, while its 
imports become more expensive.  In order to restore balance, domestic demand will need to 
expand to increase the demand for imports enough to match the increase in exports from the fall 
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in the real exchange rate.  In other words, the line that defines external balance—an optimum 
B—slopes downward.  A country is in surplus below the line and deficit above it. 
What happens if we start on the line of internal balance, that is, at non-inflationary full 
employment, and government purchases increase?  A rise in demand from an expansionary fiscal 
policy will lead to inflation.  The real exchange rate rises, our exports will become more 
expensive in other countries and will fall, and imports will become cheaper and will rise.  The 
reduction in domestic demand from the fall in exports and the rise of imports reduce the pressure 
on the domestic economy.  This means that the line that defines internal balance, that is, a 
position of non-inflationary full employment, has a positive slope.  To the right of the line, there 
is inflation; to its left, unemployment. 
Now we put these two lines together in Figure 1, where the diagram looks like a supply 
and demand diagram or an IS/LM diagram. The external balance line is downward sloping, and 
the internal balance line is upward sloping. The diagram shows one can only achieve both 
external and internal balance at the point where the two curves cross. That is to get both external 
and internal balance one must have the appropriate values for both domestic demand and the real 
exchange rate.  
It might seem that external balance occurs only when exports minus imports is zero. This 
however is not the case.  Countries may wish to industrialize by exporting more than they 
import, using what is known as an export-led growth strategy.  Other countries may wish to 
industrialize by importing more than they export in order to build an infrastructure of roads, 
railroads, and schools that promote the growth of industry.  Similarly the optimum level of 
domestic production – the position of domestic production at which there is internal balance – is 
 5 
 
not described in this model.  It is usually taken to be as close to full employment as a country can 
get without inducing unwanted inflation.  We normally define full employment as the highest 
employment consistent with stable prices. 
 Above the external balance line, the country is in deficit on its current account.  To the 
left of the internal balance line, the country is experiencing unemployment.  Deficits need to be 
financed, and being in deficit means that a country accumulated foreign debts.  These debts can 
be a problem.  Unemployment is of course a difficulty: wasting resources, degrading the work 
force and even leading to political troubles.  The costs of unemployment are not recorded in 
newspapers and annual reports like foreign debts, but they are no less real.  Countries therefore 
want to be in both internal and external balance, the point where the two curves cross.  It is an 
equilibrium in the sense that countries will approach it from any point and stay there if possible.   
 I examine what happens when a country is out of equilibrium by looking first at the 
possibility that a country could be vertically out of equilibrium, that is, directly above or below 
it.  As shown in Figure 1, it then would have multiple problems.  Being off both curves, it would 
be experiencing unemployment and an international deficit or inflation and an international 
surplus.  Despite the combination of difficulties, the imbalances can be cured by moving the real 
exchange alone.  Since the real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate times relative prices, 
it can be changed either by changing the exchange rate or prices.  I discuss this choice 
extensively later. 
 A country that is horizontally out of equilibrium faces a similar task.  Again, it will be 
experiencing both internal and external problems, but in different combination than with a 
vertical displacement.  And the policy needed to get to equilibrium is similarly clear; changing 
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fiscal policy one way or the other will do the trick.  In fact, monetary or fiscal policy will work, 
although only fiscal policy appears in the simple Keynesian identities above.  (If there is full 
capital mobility, as within the Eurozone today, then no single country can affect the interest rate, 
and monetary policy cannot be used.)  Wars typically move countries to the right in Figure 1, 
creating both internal and external imbalances.  Austerity, in the 1920s and again today, moves 
countries to the left—increasing internal imbalances in an attempt to eliminate external 
imbalances. 
 Now consider a more complex case.  To see what happens when a country is diagonally 
out of equilibrium, consider the case of a country that is in internal balance, but which has 
international debt that its creditors can no longer tolerate.  This country is on the internal balance 
line up and to the right of equilibrium.  This country needs to have a fall in both the real 
exchange rate and the fiscal stimulus.  The fall in the real exchange rate by either devaluation or 
deflation will stimulate exports and therefore domestic production.  The fall in fiscal stimulus 
then will have to be large enough to offset this effect and make room for the goods which are 
exported abroad and move the country toward equilibrium.  Lack of coordination will generate 
either unemployment or inflation.  The simple representation by the Swan Diagram points to the 
central problems of macroeconomic policies in open economies. It does this in the same way that 
the IS/LM diagram points to the central macroeconomic problems of closed economies. 
As described in this example, foreign debt can become problematic if investors begin to 
wonder whether the country will be able to reliably service its debt. It is clear that the country 
requires a combination of policies to resolve its debt problem. The first policy is to reduce 
domestic absorption; this policy is known now as austerity. Austerity on its own moves the 
country to the left in the diagram; the country has to move beyond equilibrium to achieve a 
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current account surplus and begin paying down its debt. As the diagram shows, the cost of this 
policy is unemployment. How successful will this policy be? It seems unlikely to achieve its goal 
of reassuring investors and reducing foreign indebtedness because of the costs of unemployment. 
The growth in unemployment reduces tax revenues, which in turn lowers the ability of the 
government to repay foreign debts. It also triggers government expenditures that may conflict 
with debt repayment.  European history of the early 1930s and again in the last few years 
suggests that austerity policies intensify the problem of foreign debt instead of reducing it. 
 The second policy is devaluation. Devaluation on its own will increase exports and 
reduce imports and will move the country down the graph; as in the previous description, the 
country has to move past the external balance line to generate a surplus to repay its foreign debt. 
As the diagram shows, the cost of this policy is inflation. This will not be successful if 
devaluation on its own causes inflation to increase so that the real exchange rate does not fall. In 
that case, the attempt to implement it does not move the country down in the Swan diagram at 
all.  
The indebted country requires a combination of both policies. Devaluation will increase 
exports and reduce imports. Austerity—just the right amount—will reduce home demand for 
goods and leave room for extra exports and for the home-produced goods that replace imports. 
The right combination of policies will move the economy to the intersection of the external 
balance line and the internal balance line.  There will be modest temporary inflation as the price 
of imported goods goes up; such modest inflation will help the country repay its debts, as the real 
value of its debt is reduced. To move diagonally in Figure 1, a country needs two policies; a 
firmly fixed exchange rate does not permit one of them to be used. 
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 Britain was the first industrial country to prosper by an export-led strategy.  The British 
concentrated on exporting manufactures, and they achieved great success as they had 
industrialized first.  Cotton textiles initially were their largest export, but they were joined by 
woolen goods, iron and steel, coal, and machinery.  If importing countries could not pay for these 
goods, Britain lent them the funds.  This pattern of exports paid for by balance-of-payments 
surpluses allowed Britain to continue its exports throughout the nineteenth century.  It also 
enabled Britain to accumulate an enormous portfolio of foreign assets.  This in turn allowed the 
City of London to dominate international finance and become the conductor of the international 
orchestra (Keynes, 1930, vol VI, pp. 306-07). 
The United States generally remained in both internal and external balance throughout 
the nineteenth century except during various shocks.  The first one, known as the Jacksonian 
inflation, was eerily like current problems to which I will progress.  The disturbance began when 
England exported capital to the United States to finance a land boom in the 1830s.  Anglo-
American trade with China was disrupted at this time in the run up to the Opium Wars.  Mexican 
silver that previously flowed to China through this trade lodged in American banks, allowing 
bank reserves to rise. Prices rose, particularly the price of land.  The appreciation of the real 
exchange rate was financed by capital imports from England until the Bank of England called a 
halt in 1836.  The result was a financial crisis in 1837 that led several states to default on their 
debts in the following few years.  The boom and bust took place during the administration of 
Andrew Jackson.  His policies, not wise by modern standards, have been seen as the cause of the 
crisis, but they are only one part of a more complex story (Temin, 1969; Rousseau, 2002). 
In terms of Figure 1, the English capital exports caused the United States to move upward 
along its internal balance curve, inducing inflation which raised its real exchange rate, resulting 
 9 
 
in a vertical rise.  When the Bank of England decided that American securities were no longer 
good investments, they forced the United States to adjust.  The United States did so by having a 
banking panic that lowered prices and reduced spending, moving the economy to the left and 
inducing deflation to move the United States downward back to its previous equilibrium.  The 
1837 crisis is known as a banking problem, and banks suspended payments in the course of it.  
But this was only the means by which the United States—on a specie standard with no central 
bank—devalued its currency, and this was a currency crisis. 
England was not so fortunate.  They were on the other side of the American depreciation, 
and they found their currency appreciated.  In addition, they lacked the flexible prices of the 
Americans as they had already shifted out of agriculture as they began industrialization.  They 
ended up with a lingering recession, as we would now call it.  They also were on the wrong side 
of American state bond defaults, and their recession continued into the Hungry Forties.  In terms 
of the Swan Diagram, England moved upward and to the left.  This did not have much effect on 
its external balance, but it increased unemployment (Temin, 1974). 
The United States fought a bloody and extended civil war a generation later to keep the 
growing nation together.  As might be expected, this brutal conflict created both internal and 
external imbalances in the American economy.  The inability of the government to acquire 
sufficient resources to fight the war from its tax revenues and its consequent need to borrow 
extensively led it to move to the right in Figure 1.  The expansion of absorption led both to 
inflation and a balance-of-payments deficit.  The United States clearly had to abandon the gold 
standard—as many countries would do in the First World War.  This led to a depreciation of the 
dollar, expressed as the discount of “greenbacks,” that is, paper dollars, against the nominal 
equivalent of gold.  The war ended with greenbacks heavily discounted and with the government 
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determined to return to gold, as the British Cunliffe Commission of 1918 would echo later as 
well.  It took the United States almost two decades to reduce the discount enough to go back onto 
gold in 1879. 
 The domestic imbalance was widely recognized, but the external imbalance was not 
identified until quite recently due to the great size of America and the regional conflicts that 
emerged.  The Civil War was a conflict between the North and the South.  The postwar deflation 
became a contest between the East and the West.  Western farmers who typically were in debt 
and suffered from deflation did not understand why prices needed to be forced lower.  The 
deflation continued after the resumption due to gold scarcity in the late nineteenth century and 
was seen as a conflict between staying on gold and going onto a silver standard—silver being 
mined in the West.   The plea, “You shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold,” was made 
in 1896, long after the Civil War devaluation had been forgotten (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, 
pp. 7, 58-61; Officer, 1981). 
 This speech was made not long after there had been a currency scare in 1892-93.  The 
risk that the United States might switch to silver, devaluing the dollar relative to European gold 
currencies, rose in the 1890s as Congress debated free-silver proposals.  Calomiris (1993) 
estimated that the risk of devaluation was never large, but that the fear of a temporary 
devaluation raised short-term interest rates in the 1890s.  It may be excessive in a paper about 
currency crises to mention this non-event, but it provides background for the discussion of recent 
Eurozone activity. 
 We can use the Swan Diagram to make sense of this convoluted tale.  The country’s need 
for resources with which to prosecute the Civil War forced the government to both expand its 
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spending and devalue its currency.  The resulting inflation offset the gain in the real exchange 
rate from the devaluation, leaving the government out of both internal and external balance.  The 
wholesale price level doubled during the war and stayed over 50 percent more than in 1861 
through 1870.  The exchange rate doubled also, but went back to its pre-war level more quickly 
than prices.  The result was an appreciation of the real exchange rate that lasted for a decade after 
the Civil War (Carter, et al, 2006, Series Cc113, Ee615).  The devaluation helped the United 
States get back into external balance during the war, while the deflation imposed after the war to 
get back onto gold kept domestic demand low.  It also kept political strife high. 
 These two nineteenth-century experiences, the Jacksonian crisis and the Civil War, 
provide a template for most of the currency crises of the twentieth century.  Wars and peace-time 
capital flows both lead to currency problems in the context of fixed exchange rates.  The First 
World War recapitulated the American Civil War, while the rash of currency crises in 1931 
echoed the expansion and crisis a hundred years earlier.  The First World War of course started 
out with currency crises in 1914 and various combatants going off gold, following the pattern of 
the United States in the 1860s (Silber, 2007).  They did not alter the gold price of their currency, 
but they limited in various ways access to gold.  “To have remained faithful to their legal 
obligations under the international gold standard convention would have meant for many 
countries a dissipation of gold reserves and a further blow to confidence without solving the 
foreign exchange difficulty (Brown, 1940, vol. 1, p. 15).”  Countries managed their efforts 
during the war with the freedom they gained and suffered inflation as a result.  After the war, 
they let the value of their currencies float and deflated their economies to restore the gold value 
of their currencies. This led to internal political strife in many countries, following the earlier 
pattern of the United States. 
 12 
 
 The Italian government deflated rapidly to speed resumption of the gold standard, putting 
enough strain on the political system that Mussolini could mount a successful challenge to 
democracy in 1922.  The Germans were so outraged by losing the war and having to pay 
reparations that they responded to the renewed invasion of the Ruhr to force reparations 
payments by having a hyperinflation in 1923.  The British worked so hard to argue down wages 
to aid their resumption of gold that they had a General Strike in 1926.  And the French refused to 
deflate and adopted a new, low value of the franc, destabilizing gold flows around the world 
(Temin, 1989; Irwin, 2010). 
 As in America, we tend to see German events as internal.  The hyperinflation was 
internal, but the exchange rate fell as the price rose.  Observers at the time wondered whether the 
nominal exchange rate was the cause or the effect of the hyperinflation, but in terms of the Swan 
Diagram, it was domestic expansion that led that led to devaluation through the monetization of 
the resulting debt.  The rapid change in the nominal exchange rate in 1923 was a currency crisis 
in addition to a hyperinflation. 
 The European politics of the 1920s were more virulent than those in America after the 
Civil War for several reasons.  The rich history of European politics in the aftermath of the war 
is well documented and well known.  There also was a shortage of gold in the 1920s that was of 
enough concern that the League of Nations created a Gold Delegation in 1928 to consider the 
problem.  Gold reserves of central banks fell between 1913 and 1925 from 48 percent to 41 
percent of their notes and sight deposits.  Given the inflation in those years, the smallness of this 
decline implies that central banks were able to acquire added gold reserves easily.  But where did 
this added gold come from?  It was withdrawn from circulation.  Central banks held fully 92 
percent of all monetary gold in 1929, up from 62 percent in 1913 (League of Nations, 1930, p. 
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81).  “Gold coin in circulation had fallen from nearly $4 billion in 1913 to less than $1 billion in 
1928 (Eichengreen, 1992, p. 199n, 199-203).”   
 This was a massive change in public behavior.  People went from using gold coins to 
using paper money in a very short time.  Given the long history of transacting in coins, there 
must have been strong inducement for them to change to notes and deposits.  Evidence from 
America in the years after 1929 reveals the mechanism.  Americans converted bank deposits to 
currency in the early 1930s.  In addition to the fear of bank failures, the reduction of interest rates 
reduced the cost of holding cash.  Declining yields on bank deposits altered the portfolio 
preferences of people in favor of holding cash instead of interest-bearing deposits, exerting a 
larger upward pressure on the currency-deposit ratio than the fear of bank failures (Boughton and 
Wicker, 1979). The opposite effect must have been operating in Europe a decade earlier.  Central 
banks kept their discount rates higher than they would have been if gold had been plentiful. The 
rise in interest rates led to the radical change in behavior noted in the Gold Delegation’s report.  
The need to acquire gold added to the deflationary pressure in most countries after the First 
World War. 
 These turbulent years were succeeded by a few peaceful ones that appeared to be 
prosperous.  In terms of the Swan Diagram, the principal industrial countries all had regained 
internal balance, but they were far from external balance.  German prosperity was based on a 
massive capital inflow from the United States through many private loans as well as the official 
Dawes and Young Loans.    France with its undervalued currency had an import surplus and was 
importing gold at a rapid rate.  Britain was acting as a bank, borrowing short and lending long, in 
an attempt to regain its pre-war primacy.  Currency reserves in Germany and Britain were scarce 
as both France and the United States accumulated gold.  The result of this set of external 
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imbalances was a series of currency crises in 1931 that turned a bad recession into the Great 
Depression. 
 These crises have been seen as banking crises, and banks were involved in them, but they 
were primarily currency crises.  The first crisis was a banking crisis that brought down the 
currency, but the following ones were currency crises in which banks were collateral damage.  
The first crisis came in May when the Credit Anstalt failed in Austria.  The bank was large 
enough to cause a run on the currency, and Austria had a currency crisis.  Austria however was 
too small to affect even neighboring Germany, and its currency crisis stands as a precursor of the 
major crises of the summer and fall rather than as a cause (Ferguson and Temin, 2003). 
The government budget of Weimar Germany was severely out of balance by 1931.  Tax 
revenues had fallen, and unemployment expenses had risen.  It proved impossible to agree on a 
budget, and Chancellor Brüning governed by decree.  Loans from the US and France covered the 
deficit in early 1931, but Brüning then championed a customs union with Austria and cast doubt 
on his commitment to pay reparations.  France of course had been insistent on reparations, and 
Brüning’s threats abandoned Germany’s reluctant commitment to its neighbor.  Brüning’s 
statements exacerbated tensions left over from the First World War and reduced French loans to 
Germany.  Gold reserves at the Reichsbank and deposits at the large German banks held up until 
Chancellor Brüning’s statement on reparations in early June, and then quickly fell. 
The Reichsbank tried to replenish its reserves with an international loan, but Brüning’s 
attempts to shore up his domestic support had dried up international capital flows.  The French 
tied political strings around their offer of help that were unacceptable to the Germans, while the 
Americans pulled in the opposite direction to isolate the German banking crisis from any long-
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run considerations.  The absence of international cooperation was all too evident, and no 
international loan was forthcoming.   
The data in Figure 2 reveal the path of the currency crisis.  The graph shows the daily 
price of Young Plan bonds in Paris and the weekly gold reserves of the Reichsbank from April 
through June 30, 1931.  Young Plan bonds were traded widely, and the series of Paris bond 
prices provides a good index of investor sentiment in the spring and summer of 1931.  After 
rallying early in the year, the bond price stayed remarkably constant from March to May, and 
then fell sharply during the week of May 27.  Gold reserves at the Reichsbank also stayed 
remarkably constant until the beginning of June, when they too fell.  There was no news about 
German banks in late May, but German newspapers began by May 25 to discuss the rumor that 
Brüning was likely to ask for some sort of relief in regard to reparations, as he did in early June.  
This, not phantom withdrawals from banks, was the beginning of the fatal run on the currency 
that paralyzed the Reichsbank precisely at the moment it needed reserves to foster domestic 
stability. 
Banks appealed to the Reichsbank for help, particularly the Danatbank which was hard 
hit when the currency crisis caused one of its major clients to fail.  But the Reichsbank ran out of 
assets with which to monetize the banks' reserves as its gold reserves shrank.  Despite some 
credits from other central banks, the Reichsbank had fallen below its statutory requirement of 40 
percent reserves by the beginning of July, and it was unable to borrow more.  The Reichsbank 
could no longer purchase the Berlin banks’ bills.  As in 1837, bank problems were the result, not 
the cause of the currency crisis (Ferguson and Temin, 2003; Temin, 2008). 
Widely cited in the literature as a banking crisis, this was a currency crisis that also led to 
temporary nationalization of German banks.  Germany abandoned the gold standard in July and 
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August 1931.  A series of decrees and negotiations preserved the value of the mark, but 
eliminated the free flow of both gold and marks.  In one of the great ironies of history, 
Chancellor Brüning did not take advantage of this independence of international constraints and 
expand.  He continued to contract as if Germany was still on the gold standard.  He ruined the 
German economy—and destroyed German democracy—in the effort to show once and for all 
that Germany could not pay reparations. When Brüning said later he had fallen 100 meters from 
the goal, he meant the end of reparations, not the recovery of employment, and he betrayed no 
doubt that the proper policy had been to stay within the rhetoric and framework of the gold 
standard even after abandoning convertibility itself (James, 1986, p. 35; Eichengreen and Temin, 
2000).  
As a consequence of the German moratorium the withdrawal of foreign deposits was 
prohibited, and huge sums in foreign short-term credits were frozen.  As other countries realized 
that they would be unable to realize these assets they in turn were compelled to restrict 
withdrawals of their credits.  Many other European countries suffered bank runs and currency 
crises in July, with especially severe crises in Hungary and Romania.  More importantly, the 
German crisis gave rise to a run on the pound and then the dollar. 
Britain had attempted to maintain its pre-1914 role as an exporter of long-term capital to 
the developing countries, but it could no longer achieve this in the 1920s by means of a surplus 
on current account and had to finance it by substantial borrowing from abroad. Much of the 
capital attracted to London was short term, leaving Britain vulnerable to any loss of confidence 
in sterling. The increasing deficits on the current accounts of Australia and other primary 
producers who normally held a large part of their reserves in London compelled them to draw on 
these balances in adverse times, and this further weakened Britain’s position. Britain had turned 
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itself into a bank, borrowing short and lending long, a dangerous maturity mismatch.  When 
confidence drained away in the summer of 1931, British authorities realized that sterling’s parity 
could no longer be sustained. After borrowing reserves from France and the United States in July 
and August, Britain abandoned the gold standard on September 20.  
The influence of history was of critical importance. Foreign concern about the scale of 
Britain’s budget deficit increased markedly with the publication of the Report of the May 
Committee in July 1931 and was the proximate reason for the final collapse of confidence in 
sterling. It is difficult in hindsight to understand this obsession with the deficit given the 
relatively trifling sums under discussion.  Nevertheless, this currency crisis followed the German 
crisis in a cascading collapse of the gold system. 
The Bank of England, after an initial delay to rebuild its gold reserves, sharply reduced 
interest rates in 1932. As in Germany, British monetary authorities continued for a time to 
advocate gold-standard policies even after they had been driven off the gold standard. They cried 
“Fire, Fire in Noah’s Flood,” as Hawtrey (1938, p. 145) phrased it. Although the grip of austerity 
was strong in the immediate aftermath of devaluation in Britain as well as in Germany, it wore 
off within six months in the face of public criticism by James Meade and others. British 
economic policy was freed by devaluation, and monetary policy turned expansive early in 1932. 
Across the ocean, Mellon and Hoover remained staunch in their belief in the curative 
powers of the gold standard even as the American economy collapsed around them.  One reason 
for the economic decline was a reduction in the quantity of money as people reversed the 
progress made in the 1920s and took cash out of American banks.  They were responding to 
continuing bank failures and to low interest rates.  The bank failures have received a lot of 
attention, but the effect of interest rates, as noted earlier for the 1920s, was more important 
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(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Boughton and Wicker, 1979).  This process interacted with the 
debt-deflation process outline by Fisher (1933) to depress the economy in a kind of austerity 
from inactivity instead of design. 
The Fed raised interest rates in October 1931 to defend the dollar.  This contractionary 
policy in the midst of rapid economic decline was the classic central-bank reaction to a gold-
standard crisis.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 317) acknowledged the power of the gold 
standard in this action in their account of the American contraction: 
The Federal Reserve System reacted vigorously and promptly to the external drain, as it 
had not to the previous internal drain.  On October 9, the Reserve Bank of New York 
raised its rediscount rate to 2 1/2 per cent and on October 16, to 3 1/2 per cent--the 
sharpest rise within so brief a period in the whole history of the System, before or since. . 
. The maintenance of the gold standard was accepted as an objective in support of which 
men of a broad range of views were ready to rally. 
 
The United States did not have a currency crisis, but the forces leading up to the Gerrman 
crisis and the American defensive interest-rate hike were the same.  Brüning and Hoover 
maintained their deflationary policies for as long as they were in office and continued to 
champion them after they lost power. Even after losing the 1932 election, Hoover kept trying to 
enlist the president-elect in support of the gold standard.  As late as February 1933, he tried to 
chide Roosevelt into a commitment to support the gold price of the dollar (Hoover, 1933).  
Twenty years later Hoover (1952, p. 189) repeated approvingly his 1932 claim that maintaining 
the gold standard had been good for the United States: “We have thereby maintained one 
Gibraltar of stability in the world and contributed to check the movement of chaos.”   
The postwar world economy was far different than the interwar years.   In an effort to 
avoid the crises of the interwar years, the Bretton Woods system allowed countries to change 
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their exchange rates for sufficient cause.  It was a system of stable rates, not fixed rates.  Britain 
was forced to devalue twice under the Bretton Woods system, in 1949 and 1967.  Britain had 
drifted above its equilibrium in the Swan diagram before the crises, and the currency crises 
brought it back near equilibrium.  The adjustment was sufficient in both cases to last a few 
decades, but there was a durable movement vertically up in the Swan diagram resulting in a 
crisis after about two decades.  From this point of view, Britain had moved in half a century from 
the center of the world economic system to the periphery (Cairncross and Eichengreen, 2003). 
The United States embarked on the Vietnam War in earnest in 1965.  President Johnson 
intensified the war at the same time as he promoted many domestic reforms. He hesitated to raise 
taxes in the midst of all these controversial activities, and he threw the United States into a replay 
of the internal and external imbalances during the Civil War.  In an uncanny rerun of events a 
century earlier, the United States economy overheated from the new demands made upon its 
resources, and the current account went into deficit.  In terms of Figure 1, the United States 
moved to the right and had domestic inflation and an international deficit jointly caused by an 
increase in domestic demand. 
The American import surplus created strains on other Bretton Woods countries, and 
pressure grew for the United States to devalue, but that was hard in view of the dollar’s use as a 
reserve currency.  There was an alternative, namely that the Allies’ former enemies, Germany 
and Japan, could have appreciated.  They however did not see why they should help out the 
richest and most powerful country in the world.  Countries converted their gold holdings into 
gold, and the gold backing of the dollar decreased.  This pressure threatened to turn into a run on 
the dollar, and President Nixon acted to forestall that disruption in 1971.  Nixon closed “the gold 
window,” imposed a 90 day wage and price freeze as well as a temporary tariff.  Only the first of 
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these measures lasted, and a new set of exchange rates were abandoned in favor of floating 
exchange rates after several abortive attempts to settle on a set of fixed rates.  Like the British 
devaluations, the “Nixon Shock” was to avoid a currency crisis.  Since the United States was a 
major currency, however, the Nixon Shock destroyed the Bretton Woods system and should be 
classified as a currency crisis. 
The resulting devaluation corrected the external imbalance, but it made the internal 
balance worse by intensifying American inflation.  Inflation turned into stagflation around the 
world as the scarcity of oil and wheat in 1973 sent prices skyrocketing and led to capital 
outflows from industrial countries to the Middle East at the same time as unemployment rose.  
Economic theory had followed Keynes in focusing on demand shifts, and there was no theory of 
the supply side that related to economic policy.  The high prices of raw materials were supply 
shocks, which cried for explanation.  Macroeconomics was in disarray.  Economic policy in the 
1970s was a sequence of confused efforts to end the inflation.  Success finally came at the end of 
the decade when President Carter appointed Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
System.  Volcker dramatically reduced domestic demand—absorption—by highly deflationary 
monetary policy.  Interest rates sky-rocketed, and the misery index composed of the inflation and 
unemployment rates went out of sight.  President Carter failed in his bid for reelection, and his 
successor, President Reagan, got the credit for ending the inflation (Stein, 2010).  
Many Latin American countries had borrowed heavily in the 1960s and even more 
heavily in the 1970s as inflation lowered real interest rates.  Their currencies became overvalued 
as they imported capital, and the resulting debts proved unsustainable during the Volcker 
deflation in the United States, as this abrupt change in American monetary policy sharply raised 
real interest rates and placed a large burden on the Latin American debtors.  “Debtors frozen out 
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of the world capital market learned first hand the old banking truth: ‘It is not speed that kills, it is 
the sudden stop’ (Dornbusch, 1989, pp. 9-10).”  They had rolling currency crises in the early 
1980s, and devaluation and austerity were tried to service their debts.  These policies did not 
solve the debt problems, and it required a lost decade and forbearance of some of their loans in 
the Brady plan at the end of the 1980s to end this crisis (Edwards, 1999; Frieden, 1991). 
European countries drifted back toward fixed exchange rates during the 1980s to avoid 
the short-run fluctuations that occur with floating rates.  Then came the shock of German 
reunification at the end of the decade which created huge fiscal demands on West Germany. 
There were an enormous number of things to do in Eastern Germany. The infrastructure was 
entirely out of date, as were factories.  West German fiscal problems were made worse by 
Chancellor Kohl’s decision to reunify the two German monetary systems at a one-for-one 
exchange rate between the East and West.  This decision made the East uncompetitive; it needed 
not just huge investment in infrastructure, but welfare payments for unemployed workers. The 
necessary payments meant that West Germany suddenly experienced a huge fiscal expansion and 
a booming economy as a result.  
In the face of this huge fiscal deficit, the Bundesbank raised interest rates significantly. 
Other countries in the European Monetary System needed to follow Germany. This had 
unwanted effects on these countries. Britain, in particular, was already in recession. The country 
was being governed by a demoralized Conservative party, exhausted by more than a decade of 
Thatcherite rule. Everyone knew the Conservatives wanted to win the election in 1992, and that 
the economic circumstances being inflicted by membership of the European Monetary System 
were likely to make this impossible. The country was too uncompetitive, just as it had been 
under the gold standard in 1931, especially with higher interest rates pulling the economy down 
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further. The action of the Bundesbank in raising interest rates led to very vociferous anti-German 
comment, especially as British voters realized that monetary policy in the so-called European 
Monetary System was being decided entirely on the basis of the needs of Germany.  
Ultimately it was just a matter of time until Britain was forced out of the European 
Monetary System – although Bank of England defended the currency long enough to enable 
George Soros to make many billions of dollars at the expense of the British taxpayer. Britain 
withdrew from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992. There was a valiant last-
minute attempt to raise British interest rates to extraordinary levels –to 15 percent – to try to 
defend the pound. But ultimately the beliefs of financial markets that such a policy would be 
impossible to sustain proved dominant, and Britain had a currency crisis. 
Italy was ejected from the EMS the day after Britain. Quite soon Sweden was thrown out 
too – but not until the high interest rates used to defend Swedish currency contributed to the 
bankruptcy of the entire Swedish banking system. There were significant attacks on France in the 
year which followed. It became clear that the European Monetary System could not stay where it 
was. Europe needed to go back to floating exchange rates or forward to monetary union.  Europe 
faces a similar choice today in: its monetary union will either go backward – it will break up – or 
it will go forward to a real monetary union.  The devaluations in 1992 were currency crises, and 
the current problems of the European Monetary System seemed destined to develop into more 
currency crises. 
The problem of maturity mismatch, borrowing short to invest long as Britain did in the 
1920s, was illustrated vividly on the other side of the world by currency crises in Thailand, South 
Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia—the Asian Tigers—in 1997.  These small, open countries had 
industrialized and increased their exports rapidly in the preceding years.  Their governments and 
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banks financed this expansion by borrowing short-term and rolling over the resulting 
international debts.  This process became vulnerable from the combination of fixed exchange 
rates and inadequate domestic financial institutions.  When the investors declined to renew their 
funding, the countries did not have liquid assets to replace the loans, and a crisis enveloped East 
Asia.  In terms of Figure 1, the Asian tigers were in internal, but not external, balance.  They 
were on the internal-balance line above the external balance line.  They needed capital inflows to 
continue their growth.  When investors had second thoughts, the countries had currency crises, 
defaulted and devalued (Corbett and Vines, 1999). 
The European Monetary Union was established in 1999 after a seven-year period of 
preparation in the aftermath of the currency crises of 1992. There were 12 members of the union 
initially, and the number grew to 17 today. Until three years ago, it appeared that the 
establishment of the euro had been highly successful. Many Member States enjoyed the benefits 
of belonging to a currency union, notably the high growth rates which resulted. The area was 
cushioned against economic shocks, and disruptions due to intra-European exchange rate 
realignments were a thing of the past. Financial market integration continued apace, although it 
was stronger in wholesale and securities markets than in retail banking and short-term corporate 
lending, There were wide divergences in growth rates within the Eurozone, and even serious 
divergences in the competitiveness levels and balance of payments positions of the Eurozone 
economies, but these appeared to be manageable.  Europeans felt they had emerged from the 
turmoil that followed the end of the Bretton Woods system almost three decades earlier. 
They instead were repeating the hidden imbalances of the late 1920s.  The data graphed 
in Figure 3 show that large current account deficits emerged in Southern Europe.   Capital 
imports raised real exchange rates in the GIPS, the collective acronym for Greece, Italy, Portugal 
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and Spain.  The worsening of the competitiveness position did not have the moderating effect 
imagined in the design of the euro, and the boom and inflation went on until 2008.  The countries 
remained out of external balance for a sustained period of time, and, as a result, internal 
imbalances got worse and worse, as in Europe in the late 1920s.   
The reverse occurred in Germany. The low level of inflation there caused an 
improvement in German competitiveness, leading to an increase in exports, a reduction in 
imports, and an improvement in the current account. That was meant to cause an increase in 
expenditures within Germany; and this was meant to increase relative inflation in Germany and 
stop Germany from becoming excessively competitive relative to the other countries.  A large 
current account surplus emerged in Germany, as shown also in Figure 3, but this did not have the 
desired internal moderating effect. The boom in Germany went on and on becoming more and 
more competitive, continuing until recently with a current account surplus which was continually 
rising.  The design of the euro may be fine in the long run; it ignored bubbles in the short run 
stimulated by low interest rates.  The European experience here anticipated the recent housing 
booms in the United States and China. 
Germany is the putative leader of the European Monetary Union, but it is not playing the 
part.  In November 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy together announced that Greece might end up having to leave the euro.  As the 
European crisis escalated, a German newspaper reported that the Merkel government was 
inching toward accepting euro bonds in some form, even if her public stance remained against 
them, and that some of her party said there could be a trade-off of this kind in exchange for treaty 
changes. “We aren’t saying never,” a legislator from Merkel’s coalition, told journalists. “We’re 
just saying no euro bonds under the current conditions.”  But quashing recent speculation of a 
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softening in Germany’s hardline stance on the euro, Chancellor Merkel repeated her firm 
opposition to bonds issued jointly by the euro zone countries and to an expansion of the role of 
the European Central Bank.  “Nothing has changed in my position,” she said (Erlanger and 
Kulish, 2011). 
 Fortunately, Merkel’s position softened soon afterwards. .  At the end of December the 
European Central Bank started the biggest injection of credit into the European banking system 
in the euro’s thirteen-year history. It loaned nearly loaned €500 billion to around 500 banks for 
an exceptionally long period of three years at an interest rate of just one percent, of which the 
largest amount was tapped by banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain. Then the European 
Central Bank provided another set of around 800 Eurozone banks with further €500 billion in 
cheap loans in February. These are staggering sums of money, and they were not prevented by 
Germany.  And on January 30, 2012, European Union countries signed a German-inspired treaty 
designed to underpin the euro by means of tighter fiscal rules.  
I imagine that the German chancellor looked in the rear-view mirror and saw a disastrous 
parallel from eighty years earlier.  In May 1931, another German chancellor said that Germany 
would not help a European neighbor, as recounted above.  The parallel actions – Merkel in 
November 2011 and Brüning in May 1931 – are important for several reasons.  In both cases, 
they made a bad situation worse. In addition, both statements spoke to domestic concerns of the 
chancellor, ignoring the international repercussions.   Merkel was given a reprieve by the 
European Central Bank that quelled the nascent European panic in 2012.  She has softened her 
stance and promoted changes in the European Monetary Union.  She has participated in a series 
of high-level consultations to address some causes of the current distress, and discussions 
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continue.  We do not yet know if the effects of Merkel’s initial views will live on as Brüning’s 
statements have. 
In the meantime, the European Monetary Union is replaying the American events of the 
1890s.  Fear of currency crises has caused wild fluctuations in asset prices, but—as yet—no 
devaluations.  Only time will tell if there will be a set of crises in 2013 to rival the sequence of 
1931.  Europe appears to be entering a descent that recapitulates US experience in the early 
1930s.  The parallel is with the slow, cumulative deflation from disintermediation and bank 
failures that lasted from 1930 to 1933 and the effect of deflation on debts.  Banks, like countries, 
need to exchange deposits for cash at a fixed rate, and members of the EMU need to pay their 
debts in euros.  It seems likely as I write this in late 2012 that there will be a currency crisis soon 
in Europe, perhaps the “mother of all financial crises (Eichengreen, 2010).” 
Countries were on the internal-balance line in Figure 1, but off the external-balance line.  
As in the description of earlier crises, two policies are needed to get back to equilibrium: 
devaluation and austerity.  If the Eurozone is to remain intact, then deflation is the only way to 
diminish the real exchange rate, and austerity needs therefore to be severe in order to reduce 
prices as well as domestic demand.  Given the difficulty of lowering wages in an industrial 
world, this is a tall order, as the chaos endangered by a similar effort after the First World War 
demonstrated. 
Cooperation is needed to avert a European currency crisis.  Germany needs to augment 
domestic demand, while the GIPS need to reduce theirs.  Southern Europeans cannot use the mix 
of policies used in many previous currency crises as devaluation is not allowed in the Eurozone.  
They have only one tool: domestic demand.  This will put enormous economic and political 
 27 
 
strain on the GIPS.  This strain will only be bearable if there is agreement between them and 
Germany to return to normal demand after the crisis is over. 
Leadership helps nations get to cooperative outcomes.  It is sadly lacking in international 
affairs today.  It is possible, however, for nations to act in ways that ease strains on other 
countries even without explicit cooperation.  On the world stage, China, which has been 
following an export-led strategy for the past generation, is beginning to turn inward.  As Chinese 
wages rise and the Chinese real exchange rate rises, the Chinese surplus on current account will 
peak and even begin to decline.  This will ease pressure on the United States and Europe, 
perhaps enough for America to prosper and Europe to muddle through its crisis (Temin and 
Vines, 2013).  Europe is now living through the threat of currency crises reminiscent of the 
turmoil in financial markets caused by the possibility of devaluation in the 1890s United States.  
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